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Intra-eurosystem debts 
 
 Germany is a reluctant supporter of the EU funds which are being used in the 
‘bailout’ of Ireland, and it insists on strict ‘austerity’ conditions, concerned 
about risk and moral hazard. 
 
 However, through its central bank, Germany is currently lending €325bn (December 
2010) to other central banks in the eurosystem. The Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) has 
borrowed €146bn from the eurosystem in order to support its banks. 
 
 This ‘bailout’ of Ireland via the eurosystem is larger than its official EU 
‘bailout’ (€146bn as against €67bn) and much cheaper (1% interest as against 
5.8%), but it exposes Germany to similar risks. 
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The operation of the eurosystem 
 
 
In eurozone countries, each national central 
bank (NCB) deals with its banks according to 
rules
1
 administered by the European Central 
Bank (ECB). Under routine operations, NCBs 
lend to their banks for periods of one week 
(main refinancing operations) or longer, 
through repurchase agreements (repos) against 
acceptable collateral. Since October 2008, 
refinancing has been applied by ‘full 
allotment’, meaning that the NCBs satisfy all 
bids for repo lending at the ECB’s main 
refinancing rate, currently 1%. 
 
Retail banking transactions lead, in general, to 
debts between one bank and another. These 
wholesale debts may be cleared in the 
interbank market by unsecured loans, by loans 
secured against assets, or transfers of assets 
between the banks. 
 
Wholesale debts between banks of the same 
country may also be cleared by transfers of the 
banks’ reserve deposits at the country’s central 
bank. When a retail transaction causes a debt 
between banks in different eurozone countries 
that is not cleared in the interbank market, this 
creates a claim between their respective NCBs. 
 
Suppose a deposit is moved from an Irish bank 
to a German bank. If the German bank is 
unwilling to accept payment in the form of a 
claim on the Irish bank, directly or via another 
interbank counterparty, the debt is settled via 
their central banks. The Irish bank makes up 
for its lost deposit by obtaining greater 
refinancing from its NCB, i.e. the CBI (Central 
Bank of Ireland); the German bank acquires a 
claim on the Bundesbank (German NCB), 
recognised as a net fall in the amount of 
refinancing sought by the German bank; and 
the Bundesbank acquires a claim on the CBI. 
 
Debts between NCBs created in this way are 
aggregated across the eurozone by TARGET2 
                                                 
1 The Statute of the European System of Central Banks 
and of the European Central bank. The European System 
of Central Banks (ESCB) is known as the ‘eurosystem’. 
(the EU gross settlement system). According to 
the ECB: 
 “Intra-ESCB [i.e. intra-eurosystem] 
transactions are cross-border transactions 
that occur between two EU central banks. 
These transactions give rise to bilateral 
balances in accounts held between those 
EU central banks connected to TARGET2. 
These bilateral balances are then assigned 
to the ECB on a daily basis, leaving each 
NCB with a single net bilateral position 
vis-à-vis the ECB only. This position in the 
books of the ECB represents the net claim 
or liability of each NCB against the rest of 
the ESCB.” 2 
 
Intra-eurosystem debt arising from 
cross-border transactions, December 2010 
euro billions     
claims on other NCBs liabilities to other NCBs 
Germany 325.5  Ireland *146.1 
Luxembourg 68.0  Greece 87.1 
Netherlands 40.5  Portugal 59.9 
Finland 19.7  Spain 50.9 
Italy 3.7  France 28.3 
error -0.3  Austria *23.7 
   Belgium 13.9 
   Slovakia *13.8 
   Cyprus 6.4 
   Slovenia 2.1 
   Malta 1.3 
   ECB 21.2 
   error 2.4 
total 457.1   457.1 
source: NCB financial statements and annual accounts; 
total from ECB annual account 2010 
* = estimates 
 
Intra-eurosystem debts carry interest at the 
ECB’s main official rate (currently 1%, but 
expected to rise) and outstanding values at the 
end of 2010 are shown in the table. The 
Bundesbank is doing most of the lending 
(€325.7bn: 70%) and the CBI is the biggest 
borrower (€146.1bn), followed by the NCBs of 
Greece, Portugal and Spain.  
                                                 
2 ECB annual accounts 2010, page 9. 
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Total eurosystem lending at the end of 2010 
was €457.1bn and Chart1 shows how this has 
grown by a factor of 7 since 2004. 
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Chart 1: total intra-eurosystem claims
source:  ECB annual reports
 
 
CBI support for Irish banks 
 
The large expansion of CBI debt to the 
eurosystem is a result of its banks’ loss of 
deposits, maturing debt that they have been 
unable to refinance and limited access to the 
interbank market. This follows doubts about 
the banks’ solvency and about the capacity of 
the Irish government to honour its guarantee of 
its banks’ liabilities. 
 
While most of the CBI lending to Irish banks 
has been granted in the normal way via repos 
against ECB-approved collateral, increasing 
use has been made of Emergency Liquidity 
Assistance (ELA), with this form of support 
reaching €50bn at the end of 2010 (see Chart 
2). ELA is overnight lending granted by the 
CBI on its own initiative. It is supposed to be 
for short periods and is not subject to ECB 
collateral requirements.  
 
Another way in which Irish banks are 
borrowing from the CBI while avoiding the 
ECB’s usual collateral rules is by issuing 
unsecured debt to themselves which is then 
given an Eligible Liabilities Guarantee
3
 by the 
Irish government. The ECB has deemed that 
this credit enhancement makes the debt 
acceptable as collateral for ordinary repo 
funding, and €27bn of bank debt had received 
this guarantee at the end of 2010. 
                                                 
3 Details of the ELG scheme are published by the Irish 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA). 
The ECB could, of course, tighten its collateral 
standards and its governing council is 
empowered to order the CBI to cease ELA
4
. 
However, the burden would then fall on the 
Irish government as it has guaranteed its 
banks’ liabilities, and it is no position to bear 
this. If the Irish government assumed all its 
banks’ current debts to the eurosystem, this 
would double its gross debt/GDP ratio to 
around 180%. 
 
CBI debt to the eurosystem will fall as the 
National Asset Management Agency (NAMA) 
disposes of foreign assets formerly owned by 
the banks. But there is a reluctance to engage 
in ‘firesale’ disposals at marked-down prices 
and suspicions that not all of the banks’ 
doubtful assets have yet been identified. 
 
Hence, if Irish banks are to remain in business, 
the CBI must continue funding them by 
whatever means can be devised to bypass the 
ECB’s already-diluted collateral requirements.  
In turn, other NCBs find themselves lending to 
the CBI. It is likely that this eurosystem 
support for Ireland will endure for some time 
to come. 
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Chart 2: CBI borrowing from the eurosystem
total
 borrowing
source: Money and Banking Statistics, Central Bank of Ireland
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In recognition of this continuing commitment, 
the latest plan (March 2011) being discussed is 
to replace ‘short term’ ELA with more formal 
ECB-approved lending. The ECB hopes this 
                                                 
4 The ECB has expressed concern about the quality of 
collateral for Irish ELA in opinion CON/2010/92. 
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will enable it to apply more pressure on the 
Irish government to restructure its banks’ 
assets. 
 
The ECB may not like it, but unlimited sharing 
of NCB liabilities is a necessary condition for 
the continued existence of the euro as a 
multinational currency. If Ireland had retained 
its own currency but fixed it to the euro, the 
outflow of foreign (euro) assets caused by the 
banking crisis would long ago have caused a 
devaluation of the Irish currency.  
 
However, with the single currency, the 
liabilities of any NCB (euro currency and bank 
reserves) are indistinguishable from the 
liabilities of other NCBs. Thus the CBI can 
freely incur ‘foreign’ liabilities (i.e. within the 
eurosystem), which enables the ‘fix’ of its own 
euros against the euros of other NCBs to be 
upheld.  
 
 
The EFSF bailout 
 
Under the arrangement agreed in November 
2010, Ireland is scheduled to borrow €67bn 
from the EFSF (the European Financial 
Stability Facility, backed by EU governments) 
and the IMF over the period 2011-13 at an 
average interest rate of 5.8%, conditional on 
continued fiscal ‘austerity’. 
 
As with the earlier bailout-cum-austerity 
package for Greece, this loan is ostensibly to 
help the Irish government over its borrowing 
difficulties and avoid default. But more 
austerity will impede economic growth, and 
the fact that market yields on both Irish and 
Greek government debt remain high indicates 
that investors are unconvinced. 
 
Nor are investors likely to be reassured by the 
reticence of Germany and the other bailout 
guarantors. It took months to reach agreement 
on the Greek bailout and more months to create 
the EFSF structure. There is now prolonged 
argument over the ESM (European Stability 
Mechanism), which is intended to provide a 
continuation of support after the EFSF expires 
in 2013, in exchange for even greater austerity 
in the name of the Competitiveness Pact. 
 
The Germans are naturally concerned that 
wholehearted support for bailouts would create 
moral hazard and jeopardise their own credit 
standing. And while they have a strong interest 
in eurozone banks and sovereigns staying 
afloat, they would prefer the Irish to bear the 
cost of cleaning up their banks and the Greeks 
the cost of their fiscal incontinence. This 
means they must stick to the increasingly 
untenable assumption that these economies 
will ultimately generate sufficient surpluses to 
make their debts manageable. 
 
For all Germany’s fear of becoming locked 
into permanent support for the Irish and others, 
the irony is that they are already providing 
‘bailouts’ via the eurosystem. In the Irish case, 
this is both larger than the EFSF bailout 
(€146bn as against €67bn) and much cheaper 
(1% interest as against 5.8%). And the ECB 
has progressively had to reduce its collateral 
standards, for instance, by changing its rules to 
continue accepting Greek government debt 
after this was downgraded to ‘speculative’. The 
ECB’s collateral rules are effectively being 
driven by the financing needs of the weakest 
banks. 
 
This creates its own moral hazard problem. So 
long as banks have access to cheap funding 
from the eurosystem, they are less inclined to 
seek funds elsewhere. Likewise, the Irish and 
Greek governments, having guaranteed their 
banks’ liabilities, prefer that support comes 
from the eurosystem rather than from 
themselves. The ECB tries to mitigate this 
moral hazard problem by making time-
inconsistent statements of its intentions to 
tighten its rules and procedures for liquidity 
provision. 
 
 
Should the ECB be concerned?  
 
A primary concern of the ECB is that, in 
keeping with its mandate to target inflation and 
its desire to hold down inflation expectations, it 
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should not be seen to condone the 
‘monetisation’ of government and private 
debts. This is the reason for the description of 
its refinancing operations as being ‘for 
monetary policy purposes’, with Irish ELA 
therefore regarded as a bad thing because it is 
not ‘for monetary policy purposes’. However, a 
rise in Irish ELA is automatically accompanied 
by a fall in refinancing elsewhere, which 
means there is no overall effect on the euro 
monetary base. The CBI is merely satisfying its 
banks’ demands for ‘liquidity’, as it always 
must if the banks are to remain in business, and 
it is immaterial whether this lending is classed 
as ‘for monetary policy purposes’ or not. 
 
The ECB’s monetary instrument is its official 
interest rate, and the transmission of its interest 
choices through the banking system is not 
impaired by the amounts of liquidity supplied 
by the various NCBs or the ways in which it is 
supplied.
5
 Liquidity support of Irish and Greek 
banks does not constrain the ECB’s ability to 
raise its official rate as considered necessary to 
contain inflation. 
 
However, the ECB – or rather the Bundesbank 
and other NCBs lending through the 
eurosystem – does have reason to worry about 
exposure to default risk. Irish and Greek banks 
are heavy borrowers from the eurosystem 
because of their exclusion from the interbank 
market where they are viewed as too great a 
risk. The other NCBs are therefore taking on 
this risk. 
 
NCBs lend to their banks using repurchase 
agreements. But the securities used in these 
repos are government bonds or lower quality 
assets, and ELA is explicitly government-
backed. Thus the ultimate guarantor of 
eurosystem loans to Irish banks (via the CBI) 
is, at best, the Irish government itself, whose 
debt carries a non-negligible probability of 
default or ‘restructuring’. Irish government (5-
year) debt is currently trading at a premium of 
7% as compared with Germany. 
 
In the event of Irish – or Greek – sovereign 
default, it is not clear whether losses would fall 
on NCBs or on the ECB. But this is of little 
relevance as the NCBs are the ECB’s 
shareholders and the Bundesbank is both the 
largest shareholder and the largest eurosystem 
lender. Losses of the Bundesbank would be for 
the account of the German treasury. 
 
Thus, eurosystem lending to Ireland is no less 
vulnerable than EFSF lending: both depend on 
the creditworthiness of the Irish government. 
However, while Germany is clearly 
uncomfortable about underwriting the EFSF, it 
has not expressed similar concern about its 
large exposure to Ireland and others through 
the eurosystem. Perhaps this is because it is 
powerless to do much about it.
 
                                                 
5
 If the ECB oversupplies liquidity as it did by means of 
long-term repos in 2009, the monetary base rises as the 
excess liquidity is placed in the ECB’s deposit facility. 
However, the ECB’s interest policy is then transmitted 
to the wholesale markets as the rate on the deposit 
facility.  
 
